Estimating the effect of counselling and monitoring the unemployed on their job finding rate, application intensity and matching probability by Gorter, C. & Kalb, G.R.J.
1^3 
0SL( Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie 
ET 
05348 
Serie Research Memoranda 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF COUNSELLING AND MONITORING 
THE UNEMPLOYED ON THEIRJOB FINDING RATE, 
APPLICATION INTENSITY AND MATCHING PROBABILITY 
C. Gorter 
C.R.J. Kalb 
Research Memorandum 1993-54 
november 1993 
vrije Universiteit amsterdam 

ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF COUNSELLING AND MONITORING 
THE UNEMPLOYED ON THEIR JOB FINDING RATE, 
APPLICATION INTENSITY AND MATCHING PROBABILITY. 
C. GORTER 
Department of Regional Economics 
Free University Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
G.R.J. KALB 
Department of Statistics and Research 
Joint Administration Office 
The Netherlands 

ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impact of "Counselling and Monitoring" the unemployed on their job 
finding rate, application intensity and matching probability by using a semi-structural duration 
model in which the job finding rate is equal to the product of the application intensity and the 
matching probability. "Counselling and Monitoring" is an intensive guidance programme for 
unemployed people receiving unemployment benefits which should help them to escape from the 
state of unemployment as quickly as possible. 
The empirical results, based on a control-group approach, showthat "Counselling and Monitoring" 
the unemployed reduces the duration to find a job because guided people apply more than non-
guided people, while keeping about the same matching probability. 

INTRODUCTION 
Since the economie recession at the beginning of the eighties, many western countries face a high 
level of unemployment. The persistent nature of unemployment is clearly shown by the high 
percentage of long-term unemployed (e.g. morethan 50% for several countries). On the individual 
level, this phenomenon is reflected by the well-known fact that the probability of leaving 
unemployment is rapidly decreasing after the first months of unemployment. 
In the Netherlands, various labour market policies are used to combat long-term 
unemployment such as, for example, wage-subsidies for the employer when hiring a long-term 
unemployed person, "schooling" programmes for the unemployed and the creation of so-called 
"job-pools" through which the unemployed obtain work-experience. However, the overall 
effectiveness of these policy instruments appeared to be rather modest (see, for example, De 
Koning, 1991, who concluded that "only selective wage-subsidies have had a demonstrable effect 
on long-term unemployment"). Therefore, it is important to develop policy measures which prevent 
that people become long-term unemployed, so that the individual well-being will be improved in 
terms of income, social contacts and of social status. Moreover, the re-entering of short-term 
unemployed people will substantially reduce the costs of the social system (total of unemployment 
benefits) and also improve the functioning of the labour market. Hence, an instrument is asked for, 
which can positively influence the entry and re-entry probabilities of short-term unemployed job 
seekers. 
In the light of these considerations, the Joint Administration Office (GAK), i.e., the office that -
among other benefits - takes care of the allocation of unemployment benefits, has designed a 
special programme for the people who become unemployed and are entitled to receive 
unemployment benefits. This programme is called "Counselling and Monitoring" and aims to assist 
unemployed people in their attempts to find a job. Essentially, the programme consists of two 
parts. First, unemployed people are informed about present vacancies, potential search methods 
to discover suitable vacancies, schooling possibilities and various application techniques (i.e., the 
counselling process). Moreover, unemployed are stimulated to search intensively on the labour 
market and to develop their own search strategies. The second part of "Counselling and 
Monitoring" consists of recording the search activities of the unemployed, so that it can be ver'rfied 
whether they actually show active search behaviour (i.e., the monitoring process). In short, 
"Counselling and Monitoring" is an intensive guidance programme for the unemployed which 
should help them to escape from the state of unemployment as quickly as possible. 
The aim of this paper is to assess the effect of the "Counselling and Monitoring" programme 
on the duration to find a job. This effect will be estimated by means of a semi-structural job search 
model in which the job finding rate is written as the product of the application intensity and the 
conditional matching probability. By using this model, it can be taken into account that the 
unemployed job seeker influences the probability of receiving a job offer, i.e., the job offer arrival 
rate is endogenous. In job search theory, the arrival of job offers is originally assumed to be a -
random - exogenous process, reflecting the demand-side of the labour market. More recently, the 
job search literature has found that individual differences in unemployment are driven by 
differences in the job offer arrival rates (see, for example, Devine and Kiefer, 1989). Empirical job 
search models with an endogenous job offer arrival rate have, until now, been scarce (see, for 
example, Yoon, 1981, Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen, 1987, and Lindeboom and Theeuwes, 
1991). In addition, relatively few empirical studies have been carried out in which the emphasis is 
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on the determinants of search intensity. Some authors have focused on the effect of 
unemployment benefits on search intensity, measured by the number of search methods used 
(see, for example, Barron and Mellow, 1979, Tannery, 1983, Wadsworth, 1991, Schmitt and 
Wadsworth, 1991, and Blau and Robbins, 1990). Holzer (1988) also investigated the determinants 
of search intensity, but he included the expected outcomes on the job offer probabilities in the 
model (i.e., endogenised the job offer arrival rate in the search intensity equation). Kahn and Low 
(1988) consider the choice of the search channel as "an important step in understanding the 
process by which the arrival of job offers varies across job seekers". Therefore, they deveiop and 
test a model for the job seeker's demand for labour market information. 
In the present paper, search intensity is captured by the number of applications made (cf. 
Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen, 1987). Empirical findings on the determinants of the application 
intensity are almost absent in the literature (see, for exceptions, Daniel, 1990 and Gorter et al., 
1993a). Moreover, the explicit use of the application intensity in a structural job search model 
offers the possibility to identify the probability that a match will occur if an application is made. 
Lindeboom et al. (1993) have estimated matching probabilities (conditionai on an application) for 
employers and workers who use personnel advertisement as a search channel. Starting from a so-
called matching function for employers and job seekers, they derive a micro model for vacancy 
and job search duration. In this model, the contact probability and the conditionai matching 
probability are identified by using information on whether or not applicants have arrived at a 
vacancy and whether or not a worker has made an application. Moreover, it is assumed that (1) 
the parameters of the application probability and the conditionai matching probability of the job 
search model are equal in the duration models for vacancy and job seekers and (2) duration 
dependence in the hazard rates for workers and vacancies is absent. 
The empirical model used in this paper allows for the effects of duration dependence and 
unobserved heterogeneity on the duration to find a job and the application intensity. Furthermore, 
the data is collected to allow a control-group approach to consider the impact of the guidance 
programme. 
In sum, we will estimate the effect of "Counselling and Monitoring" the unemployed on their 
job finding rate, application intensity and matching probability. By doing so, we can conclude 
whether the programme reduces the period to find a job and if so, whether this reduction sterns 
from an increase in the number of applications per period or the "success" probability of an 
application. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we present a theoretical search model 
with an endogenous job offer arrival rate. A statistical model for the duration to find a job and the 
number of applications made is introduced in section 3. Section 4 describes the data and the 
estimation results are presented in section 5. Finally, in section 6, we draw some conclusions. 
2. A SEARCH MODEL WITH AN ENDOGENOUS JOB OFFER ARRIVAL RATE 
Job search theory has been developed to describethe behaviour of unemployed people who want 
to fill vacant jobs in an uncertain and dynamic environment. In this theory, the probability of finding 
a job for an unemployed job seeker is equal to the product of the probability of receiving and 
accepting a job offer. In empirical studies, the job offer arrival rate is usually modelled as an 
exogenous process. In this paper, we will use a search model with an endogenous job offer arrival 
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rate, so that search activities of the job seeker can affect the probability of receiving an offer 
(theoretical search models with variable search intensity are introduced by Mortensen, 1977 and 
Burdett, 1978). An empirical application of this kind of model can be found in Lindeboom and 
Theeuwes (1991) who used the number of direct searcher-employer contacts as an indicator for 
search intensity. 
In this paper, search intensity is measured by the number of attempts to acquire an offer, i.e., 
the number of applications made by the job seeker (cf. Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen, 1987, and 
Gorter et al., 1993a). This implies that the job offer arrfval rate is equal to 
x =
 H.Pr (1) 
with 
X = job offer arrival rate, 
p.a = application intensity, 
Pr = probability of receiving a job offer (gfven that one applied for it). 
Starting from the Standard job search model, we assume that unemployed job seekers have 
imperfect'information about the availability of jobs and associated wages. Information on the 
existence of vacancies is spread by employers via various recruitment channels such as the use 
of advertisements, informal contacts and the labour exchange office. The unemployed job seeker 
tries to acquire information about the wages and other vacancy characteristics associated with the 
job openings by submitting applications1. Each application may lead to a job offer with a wage 
w (without recali); the probability of receiving an offer, conditional on an application, is equal to 
Pr. The distribution of wage offers f(w) with cd.f. F(w) is assumed to be known to the job seeker 
and he or she is confronted with an observation of this distribution if a job offer is generated. 
Applications for jobs are not without costs. Indirect costs of forgone leisure and direct costs of 
locating a job vacancy and applying for it (for example, by wrfting a letter) are the most important 
contributors to the application costs c(/*a). Each time that an application leads to an offer, the job 
seeker has to decide whether to accept or reject a job offer. It is assumed that the accepted job 
will be kept f orever at the same wage. Consequently, the present value of the future wage is w, 
divided by the subjective discount rate p. Rejecting an offer means a loss of expected income and 
a continuation of search (application) costs, whileaccepting implies that income gainsfrom higher 
future wage offers cannot be realised any more. If search is continued, the job seeker receives 
unemployment benefit b which may vary over time. 
Hence, the job seeker is facing a non-stationary search environment in which the benefit level 
b(t), the wage offer distribution F(w,t) and the subjective rate of discount p are known to the job 
seeker, while the job offer arrival rate x is influenced by the number of applications submitted per 
period. Moreover, the job seeker has to accept or reject the generated job offers. Now, if the aim 
of the unemployed people is to maximise their individual expected present value of the income 
streams over an infinite horizon, it follows that the optimal strategy is to search sequentially and 
accept a job offer if the wage is higher then the so-called reservation wage, i.e., the minimum 
Of course, job vacancies have to be discovered before applications can be made (see also 
Narendranathan and Nickell, 1985). The job seeker's access to information on job openings may 
be limited by the recruitment strategy of the employer (see for example, Gorter et al., 1993b). 
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wage level for which he or she is willing to work. 
The level of the reservation wage w* and the optimal application intensity /xa can be found by 
applying Bellman's dynamic optimality principal. If V(t) is defined as the expected present value 
of income at t when following the optimal strategy, it follows that w* and /xa satisfy the following 
first order conditions: 
?¥@- = nr ' ( l ) - | l>(0-c( | ia(0) l - | 1 ' ( < ? , P , r ( < ) . ƒ \w-w*{t)\dF(w,t) (2) 
with w*(t) =
 P.V(f) 
. ƒ (w-w*(f))dF(w,t) (3) 3c(na(Q) _ Pr{t) 
*,(*) ' P
 w .w 
In equation [2] we observe the non-stationary relation for the reservation wage (see also for 
example, Van den Berg, 1990). The first order condition with respect to the application intensity 
(equation 3) gives rise to an equality of marginal costs and benefits of applying. It implies that at 
the optimum the marginal costs of applying once more (per period) is equal to the (discounted) 
marginal income gain of an offer multiplied by the probability that an additional application induces 
a job offer. It can be seen from [3] that the marginal benefits of applying are not varying with the 
application intensity so that we must have - for arriving at an unique equilibrium - that the marginal 
costs of applying are rising with the application rate. This means that each additional application 
is more costly than the previous one, which may, for example, be due to the fact that locating an 
additional suitable job vacancy requires an increasing amount of time and search efforts. In 
conclusion, the optimal application rate will be higher at lower costs and higher benefits (ceteris 
paribus). 
If the unemployed job seeker follows the decision rules [2] and [3] then the hazard rate of 
leaving unemployment is 
6 = X . 11-f (IV*)] = na.Pr [ 1 - ^ 0 0 1 - Ma-Pm (4> 
with 
e = hazard rate 
Pm = matching probability, given an application (Pr[1-F(w*)]) 
In the Standard model, the arrival rate of job offers is random, not infiuenced by search activities 
of the job seeker and can therefore be interpreted as the "chance" component of the job search 
process (in other words, it accounts for the demand-side of the labour market). The probability of 
accepting an offer, on the other hand, is entirely controlled by the job seeker, representing the 
"choice" component. This interpretation changes if the job offer arrival rate is divided into the 
application intensity and the conditional probability of receiving a job offer. In this extended 
specification of the hazard, the "choice" behaviour of the job seeker also arises at the beginning 
of the job search process. This seems to be more realistic - in our opinion - than assuming that 
job offers arrive at random ("come as manna from heaven"). Moreover, the conditional "chance" 
component is the response of the selective choice behaviour of the employer, who is confronted 
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with an application of a job seeker2. This conditional "chance" component is muitiplied by the 
familiar choice component of accepting an offer to arrive at the so-called matching probability. 
Consequently, the matching probability represents the acceptance behaviour of both the employer 
and the job seeker after a contact is made via an application. We note that if one knows the wage 
level of the vacancy before applying for it and one only applies if one is prepared to accept its 
offer, the matching probability exclusively reflects the effect of the employers's acceptance 
behaviour. In that case, the matching probability is equal to the job offer probability, given that an 
application is made (see Gorter et al., 1993)3. 
In sum, the full model is defined by the two first order conditions for the reservation wage and 
the optimal application intensity (see [2] and [3]) and the structural equation for the hazard rate 
(see [4]. Information on both the reservation wage and the number of applications is needed to 
apply a fully structural approach, that is to make explicit use of the optimality conditions. This 
approach will not be foliowed here, because we do not have data on the reservation wage4. In 
addition, estimating a fully structural, non-stationary, modei with an endogenous offer arrival rate 
is far from easy and will lead to burdensome computations. 
In this paper, we will estimate reduced form equations for the number of (unsuccessful) 
applications and the hazard rate, separately. This model is in line with the approach foliowed by 
Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991), but - as mentioned before - they use the number of direct 
searcher-employer contacts in which no distinction is made between attempts to make contacts 
and actual contacts made. Furthermore, they can not identify the underiying components of the 
hazard rate. In this paper, the hazard rate is equal to the product of the application rate and the 
probability that a match occurs if an application is made (see [4]). In our empirical work, we will 
identify both components by using Information on the duration and the number of applications5. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether "Counselling and Monitoring" (abbreviated as 
CM) the unemployed reduces the period to find a job. The semi-structural search model described 
above makes it possible to examine whether "Counselling and Monitoring" the unemployed leads 
to a reduction of the period to find a job (ceteris paribus), and if so, whether this reduction is 
caused by the fact that "guided" unemployed apply more f requently than "non-guided" unemployed 
or that "guided" unemployed have a higher matching probability than "non-guided" unemployed 
2
 Probably, several people will apply for a vacancy, offering the employer the possibility to piek 
out the "best" one from a pool of applicants. Altematively, the employer might also consider the 
applicants at the moment of arrival on the basis of the expected level of labour productivity. 
3
 This kind of search behaviour can also be described by means of a systematic search model 
in which job seekers have information of the wage offer and associated offer probability for n 
vacancies and tend to contact their best opportunities first. 
4
 Under certain conditions, it is possible to estimate the (stationary) equation for the 
reservation wage from other information. Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen (1987) used the number 
of offers obtained, the observed wage and the number of periods searching to estimate the 
relation between the reservation wage and the expected wage offer and the offer probability. 
5
 An analogous approach is used by Van Ours and Ridder (1992) in a semi-structural model 
of vacancy duration. In this model the hazard rate is split up into the product of the rate at which 
applicants arrive and the probability that an applicant is suitable and hired by the firm. 
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if an application is made. Summing up, we wili estimate the effects of CM on the hazard rate, the 
application intensity and the matching probabiiity by using the following relation: 
6{Z,X(t)J,CM) = ixa(Z,X{t),t,CM) . Pm(Z,X(t),t,CM) (5) 
with X(t) and Z vectors of relevant person-related characteristics. 
3. A STATISTICAL MODEL OF THE DURATION TO FIND A JOB 
AND THE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS. 
In order to estimate the effect of CM on the search behaviour of the unemployed job seeker (see 
also [5]), we will use data on the duration to find a job and the number of applications made in 
each subsequent period of four weeks. Let T be the duration to find a job and k the number of 
applications, then we observe (T,k*,kn..,, k^,..,^) with ks at t=28i days for i=1 ,..n-1, and k* at t=T. 
To arrive at empirical results, we need the joint distrtbution of the random variables (T.k*,^..,, 
kn-2'--'ki)- !t is assumed that unemployed individuals search according to the theoretical model 
described in the previous section. This implies that applications are evaluated by the firm at the 
moment of arrival and immediately accepted or rejected. If the job is offered to the appiicant, he 
or she also decides to accept or reject at once. Moreover, we assume that the optimal reservation 
wage and number of applications per period are set by the job seeker at the beginning of each 
period (of 28 days) and remain constant during this period. 
We will derive the joint distribution function of the duration and the number of applications (in 
each period) as follows. First, note that the marginal density function of duration t is given by 
t 
f{t)=e{t).exp(-le{s)ds) (6) 
so that the survivor function S(t) = 1-F(t) is equal to 
co t 
S(t) = (f{s)ds = exp(-fe(s)ds (7) 
Let ii{=na. [1 -Pm] be the arrival rate of unsuccessful applications. We will assume that the number 
of unsuccessful applications follows a Poisson process with parameter nr so that the density 
function for the number of unsuccessful applications ks during the period t,..,, t; (registered at ts) 
becomes: 
I ƒ %(.)!»
 (8| 
/>(*il'>!|-,) • <>xp<- ƒ ^(sldsl.-Li-, 
Next, we can write the joint probabiiity of the event (T,^ ,^ , . . ,^ ) as: 
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Pr(T,kn,kn_-i,..,k-i) = 
Pr(T,kn | f>fn.1,/fn_1,..,lf1).Pr(f>fn.1,/(n-i.-/c1) = 
Pr{T\t>tn_vkn_v..,kJ.Pr(kn \ T,t>tn.vkn^,.k^).Pr(t>tn_vkn.v..k1) 
and repeat this for Pr(t>tn.1,kn.1,..,k1), Pr(t>tn.2,kn.2>..,k1),..,Pr(t>t1,k1), sothat 
^ ( ^ n ' ^ n - l ' - ' ^ l ) = 
PriTlM^kn-v-k^.Pri^\ T,t>tn_vkn_„..k,). 
n-1 
I I Pr(t>t, I t>ti_vki_v..ki).Pr(k.l | f>fi_1l/cM,./<1) 
i=1 
Hence, we find for the joint density of a completed spell of vacancy duration T (i.e., one 
successfui application at t=T), kt unsuccessful applications at t=28i days for i=1,..n-1, and k*-l 
unsuccessful applications at t=T: 
g(T,k*,kn_v..k,) = 
/:(T|f>fn_1,/fn_1,..,/c1) . h(k*-1 |7,f>fn_1l*n_l.».*l) • 
n-1 
J[S(ti\t>tl_i,ki_,,..k:) . h(ki\t>t]_,j(M,..iki) = (11> 
i=1 
n-1 
f(T\kn_v..,ki).h{k*-i | r,f>fn.1,/cn_i.--. 'f i).n / j( / f i K> 'M . * i - i . - * i ) 
i=1 
so that the joint density can be written as the product of the marginal density of T and the 
conditional - on survival - density of the number of unsuccessful applications (k*-1 ,kri_1,..,k1)6. 
Our data consists of both completed spells and incompleted spells of duration. In case of 
incompleted spells (t>T), the contribution to the likelihood function is: 
n-1 
S(r |*n .1-* l ) - " (** l^> 'n-1. fn-1."^ l ) - I I ' I (* i l '> f l -1 .*M.-* l ) (12) 
i=1 
4. DATA AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
The data was coilected by the Department of Statistics and Research of the Joint Administration 
Office in order to evaluate the effectiveness of an experimental programme in which people, who 
enter the state of unemployment and are eligible to unemployment benefits, are assisted to find 
a job (see also Overbeeke and Kalb, 1991). The sample is drawn from the flow into unemployment 
during November 1989 - January 1990 at seven regional offices of the administration (located in 
Haarlem, Maastricht, Arnhem, Vlaardingen, Apeldoorn, Venlo and Rijswijk). To be included in the 
sample, one should satisfy the following conditions, however. The unemployed persons must be 
less than 57.5 years old, willing to obtain a permanent position if they were previously employed 
6
 Note that we have used that S(tM | kj_1,..,k1) is equal to S(tM | k^,..,^). 
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0) 
(10) 
via a temporary employment agency, and should not begin to work in a new job within a period 
of three weeks. 
Next, the experimental programme Counseiling and Monitoring ("Begeleiding en Controle") was 
randomly assigned to about 50% of this sample. The programme started for the people in the 
treatment group at the moment of the first contact with the administration (moment of intake) 
which took place shortly after becoming unemployed. 
The search activities and labour market events of this sample were recorded by interviewing 
each individual every four weeks for a total period of about one year (see Figure 1). The interviews 
provide information on the number of applications made, the search channels used (looking at 
advertisements, consulting employers and the labour exchange office), and the number of offers 
to visit an employer for an application in the previous four weeks. 
Figure 1 The observation plan 
I I I i I I > 
intake 
I 
first 
interview 
I 
second 
interview 
I I 
third 
interview 
I I * 
(n-1)th nth 
interview interview 
An important advantage of the use of administrative data is the exact knowledge of the pre-
unemployment wage level (and the associated benefit leve!) and the length of unemployment 
duration (in days). Moreover, the data set provides detailed information on (a) person-related 
characteristics, namely age, educational level, gender and the presence of person-specif ie barriers, 
and (b) labour market characteristics, namely the number of hours available, labour market history 
of the individual (number of years of (un)employment in the previous five years, permanent or 
temporary previous job), and the occupational group the individual belonged to. The time period 
between assignment of CM and finding a job is used as the duration variable in our model. The 
data on duration includes right-censored observations for those who have not found a job at the 
moment of the last interview. 
From the total sample, we seiected the observations which provided full information on the 
"search-history" of the individual (that is the search channels used and the number of applications 
made). Furthermore, registered duration should be consistent with the number of interviews 
recorded and the period between becoming unemployed and assignment of CM (from now on 
referred to as pre-intake period) should be less than 60 days. The latter selection criterion is 
necessary because otherwise we would include people who became unemployed a long time ago, 
had a job for a short whiie, and then re-entered the state of unemployment before intake took 
place. As a result of these selection criteria, the sample mean of the number of days unemployed 
before the moment of the first contact (intake) falls from 46.2 to 9.6 days. Despite this change of 
composition, the random assignment of CM is still valid according to a simple test on the sample 
statistics (mean and Standard error) of the "labour market history" variables for those recefving and 
those not receiving CM. 
In Table 1, we present the sample means of the variables, both for the whole sample and for 
the seiected subsample. 
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Table 1 Sample means of the variables. 
(Z) Person-related characteristics 
* age (in years) 
* educational level 
primary 
IOM vocational 
low secondary 
medium vocational 
medium secondary 
high secondary 
high vocational 
academie 
* female 
* person-specifie barriers 
* wage per hour (in guilders) 
* number of hours available 
* permanent (previous) job 
* years employed in previous five years 
* years unemployed in previous five years 
* days unemployed before intake 
* occupational group 
management 
administrative 
sa les 
servi ces' 
agricultural 
construction 
metal industry 
other industries 
transport 
military service 
* location of "district office" 
Haarlem 
Maastricht 
Arnhem 
VIaardingen 
Apeldoorn 
Venlo 
Rijswijk 
Person-related characteristics CX(t)] 
search strategy7: 
* looking at advertïsements 
* labour exchange office 
* consulting employers 
saaple si i jsaaple 
29 30 
21 % 16 % 
28 % 25 % 
18 % 21 % 
11 % 12 % 
10 % 12 % 
4 % 4 % 
5.% 7 % 
3 % 3 % 
34 % 33 % 
15 % 11 % 
15.35 15.25 
39.15 39 .50 
84 % 83 % 
2.4 2.3 
0.5 0.4 
46 .2 9.6 
10 % 10 % 
26 % 30 % 
5 % 4 % 
13 % 12 % 
1 % 1 % 
3 % 2 % 
5 % 5 % 
19 % 15 % 
6 % 7 % 
12 % 14 % 
20 % 26 % 
13 % 11 % 
7 % 7 % 
28 % 28 % 
10 % 8 % 
13 % 8 % 
9 % 12 % 
75 % 83 % 
47 % 51 % 
33 % 40 % 
Counselt ing and Honitoring (CM) 53 % 55 % 
Duratïon (t) 
* duratïon from the 
moment of intake (in days) 
* completed spel Is 
71.9 
77% 
69.5 
88% 
Niafaer of applications per 28 days (k) 0.8 
number of observations 1631 
1.0 
722 
7
 These values are obtained by computing the percentage of people - who are still in the 
sample - using a certain search channel for each period and next, taking the mean over time. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we present estimation results of reduced form models for the number of 
unsuccessful applications (kj) and the duration to find a job (T)8. Next, the reduced form 
estimates are used to identify the intensity of applications made (/*a) and the matching probability 
(Pm). The reduced-form models are estimated with the data described in section 4. Except for the 
search (dummy) variables X which may have different values each period of four weeks, the 
exogenous variables Z do not vary over time. In the model for the number of unsuccessful 
applications, we omitted the last observation (kn). This is done because, in case of completed 
spells, some observations on the number of applications are inconsistent with our model (kn is 
equal to zero), while in case of incompleted spells, the observations refer to the last period of four 
weeks which may be longer or shorter than the remaining period being observed as unemployed 
(see also Figure 1). Furthermore, we only included the number of applications in the previous 
period (k..,) to avoid multicollinearity between the number of applications reported in subsequent 
previous periods. 
First, we estimate a reduced-form model for the number of unsuccessful applications reported 
at each interview (except for the last one). The likelihood is based on the density function of the 
number of applications (k,,.,.^...^), conditional on survival (see [12]). The arrival rate of 
unsuccessful applications is specified as 
8 
M r(f |Z,X(f ) ,CM,*_i ) = exp(Z /a1+X(0 /ff i*CM.i81+SD,(f) . [T1 |+öi.fci-1]) (13> 
i - 1 
and the time-varying dummy variables Dj(t),i=l...,7 equal to one if 28(i-1)days < timet < 28idays 
for i=1,7 and more than 196 days for i=8. We note that about 3% of the sample is left in the last 
period, which is considerably less in comparison with the entire sample due to the stringent criteria 
on "complete" search history. 
Second, a reduced-form model for the duration to find a job (from the moment of intake) is 
estimated. For this purpose, we use a flexible base-line hazard model with the hazard of finding 
a job specified as 
8 
6(t\Z,X(t),CM,k.i) = exp(Z/a2+X(0/ff2^M./32+£Dj(f).[Yj2+ö2fri-i]) ( 14 ) 
i=1 
The parameters of this model can now be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function based 
on the marginal density function of time T (see also [12]). 
The estimation results of the reduced-form models are shown in table 2. We start with a 
discussion of the person-reiated effects on the application rate and the duration to find a job. The 
8
 We found in section 3 that the joint density function factorises into a "duration" part and an 
"application" part. Consequently, ft is possible to estimate the relation for the hazard rate and the 
arrival rate of rejected applications separately, given that the joint density function of the 
unobserved components (error-terms) for the duration and the number of applications can also 
be factorised (see also Lindeboom and Theeuwes, 1991). 
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outcomes of the "application model" can be interpreted in the context of our theoretical model in 
which the number of applications made will be higher at lower costs and/or higher benefits of an 
additional application. From Table 2, we can see that the application rate is significantly higher for 
people with a higher educational level, who were longer previously employed and applied more 
often in the previous period. Moreover, searchlng by consuiting employers and - to some less 
extent -looking at advertisements leads to more applications per period than consuiting the labour 
exchange office. On the other hand, there are significantly negative effects on the application rate 
from the age of the job seeker, personal-specific barriers and the total length of unemployment 
experiences in the past. It seems likely that these characteristics are associated with higher costs 
and lower benefits of applying, so that the optimal level becomes lower. We also observe 
considerable differences in the effects on the application rate that are related to occupational 
group, the location of the regional office and the number of days unemployed at the moment of 
intake. The results of person-related variables appear to be in line (except for education) with the 
findings of Gorter et al., 1993a, who found that older people apply considerably less, while the 
expected wage level and the preference for a full-time job have a strongly positive effect on the 
application rate. 
Next, we discuss the resuits of the person-related variables on the duration to find a job. First 
of all, we note that less parameters are significant. Unemployed people with a medium educational 
level obtain a job more quickly than those who have a lower (primary, low vocational) and a higher 
(academie) educational level. A significantly positive effect on the job finding rate is also found for 
the use of consuiting employers, while in case of the use of advertisements we observe the 
opposite effect. The negative effect of using advertisements (instead of not using them) is rather 
surprising, especially because people who report to use advertisements also appear to apply more 
f requently. A possible explanation might be that people who do not look at advertisements are not 
confronted with many competitors if they make a contact with an employer (e.g. they may be 
asked to apply for a job), while those who look at advertisements encounter severe competition 
when they apply for a job (which is probably announced via an advertisement)9. The wage level 
of the previous job appears to have a significantly negative impact on the duration. In the first 
period of unemployment, the Dutch unemployment benefit level has an one-to-one 
correspondence with the wage level received in the last job. Therefore, this variable might be 
interpreted as a measure for the unemployment benefit level (although it also reflects - of course -
the level of the expected wage level in the next job). In this interpretation, there seems to be a 
negative effect of the absolute benefit level on duration which is usually not found in other Dutch 
empirical studies of unemployment duration (see, for example, Groot and Jehoel-Gijsbers, 1990 
and Gorter and Gorter, 1993c). Differences in occupational group, the location of the regional 
office and the number of days unemployed before intake took place also give rise to substantial 
deviations in the duration to find a job. With respect to occupational group, we see that - in 
particular - construction workers are (re)-hired within a short period (while applying less frequent 
than other workers). 
9
 We checked whether the use of several search channels simultaneously biased the "main-
effects" for the channels by extending the model with interactions terms. The results showed that 
the interaction played no role and the "main-effects" remained unchanged. 
11 
Table 2 Parameter estimates of reduced-form models for the application rate 
and the duration to find a job (Standard errors): * : significant at 5% 
Person-related characterïstïcs [Z] 
* log(age) 
* educational level (primary) 
low vocational 
low secondary 
medium vocational 
medium secondary 
high secondary 
high vocational 
academie 
* female (male) 
* person-specific barriers 
* wage per hour/10 
* log(hours work) 
permanent job (temporary) 
number of years employed 
number of years unemployed 
days unemployed before intake 
occupational group (management) 
admimstrative 
sa les 
services 
agricultural 
construct ion 
met al 
other industries 
transport 
military service 
location of regional office (Haarlem) 
Maastricht 
Arnhem 
VIaardingen 
Apeldoorn 
Venlo 
Rijswijk 
Person-related characterïstïcs Dt(t)3 
* search strategy 
advertisements (not) 
labour exchange office (not) 
consulting employers (not) 
* number of rejected applications 
in previous period of 28 days 
Elapsed duration (t) 
0 - 2 8 days 
28 - 56 days 
5 6 - 8 4 days 
8 4 - 1 1 2 days 
112 - 140 days 
140 - 168 days 
168 - 196 days 
more than 196 days 
Counselling and Nonïtorïng (CM) 
yes 
yes x permanent job 
Number of observations 
Mean log-likelihood 
APPLICATION RATE DURATION TO FIND A JOB 
(« T> ( HAZARD RATE ) 
-0.24 (0.13) * -0.34 (0.22) 
-0.00 (0.09) 0.14 (0.13) 
0.10 (0.09) 0.20 (0.15) 
0.15 (0.10) 0.33 (0.16) * 
0.10 (0.11) 0.32 (0.17) 
0.09 (0.13) -0.10 (0.24) 
0.43 (0.12) * 0.20 (0.21) 
0.65 (0.15) * -0.26 (0.31) 
0.08 (0.07) -0.07 (0.11) 
-0.39 (0.11) * -0.17 (0.15) 
0.04 (0.04) -0.22 (0.08) * 
0.22 (0.16) -0.01 (0.25) 
-0.19 (0.14) -0.76 (0.16) 
0.05 (0.02) * 0.01 (0.03) 
-0.08 (0.03) * -0.04 (0.04) 
-0.006 (0.003) * -0.02 (0.005) * 
0.18 (0.10) -0.29 (0.17) 
0.05 (0.17) -0.17 (0.25) 
0.05 (0.11) -0.39 (0.18) 
-0.66 (0.38) -0.83 (0.61) 
-0.57 (0.40) 0.61 (0.30) * 
-0.01 (0.15) -0.17 (0.24) 
-0.24 (0.12) * -0.45 (0.19) * 
-0.34 (0.17) * 0.04 (0.21) 
0.19 (0.12) -0.02 (0.19) 
-0.06 (0.11) -0.27 (0.15) 
0.16 (0.14) 0.12 (0.18) 
0.31 (0.08) * 0.03 (0.12) 
0.02 (0.13) 0.00 (0.17) 
0.01 (0.11) -0.38 (0.19) * 
0.13 (0.11) 0.03 (0.15) 
0.25 (0.07) * -0.31 (0.08) * 
0.08 (0.05) * -0.10 (0.08) 
0.39 (0.05) * 0.25 (0.07) * 
0.16 (0.01) * 
3.71 (0.83) 
4.08 (0.83) 
4.16 (0.83) 
4.15 (0.84) 
4.22 (0.84) 
3.99 (0.84) 
4.74 (0.86) 
4.42 (0.84) 
0.05 (0.17) 
0.17 (0.18) 
722 
-2, .57 
0.05 (0.03) 
1.74 (1.31) 
1.81 (1-31) 
1.83 (1.31) 
1.54 (1.32) 
1.58 (1.32) 
2.12 (1.35) 
2.17 (1.39) 
3.55 (1.38) * 
0.50 (0.20) * 
0.61 (0.22) * 
722 
-4. .57 
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In the following part of this section, we discuss the main issue of this paper, namely the effect 
of Counselling and Monitoring. In addition, we show howthe hazard rate, the appiication rate and 
the matching probability vary over time according to our estimates. The estimation results on the 
hazard rate and the arrival rate of unsuccessful applications can be used to calculate the 
appiication intensity and the matching probability. 
It follows from our theoretical model that the appiication intensity is equal to 
Ma = M r + Ö (15) 
and the matching probability is equal to 
Pm' 
e+*i, 
(16) 
Now, we first consider the hazard rate, the appiication intensity and the matching probability 
for an - econometrical - average unemployed individual (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Hazard rate. appiication intensity and matching probability 
HAZARD RATE 
DURATION IN WEEKS 
+ APPL. INT. o MATCH ING PROB. 
It can be seen that the appiication rate is approximately equal to 1.5 during the first six periods 
of four weeks. After this period, the rate decreases to less than 1 per period (of four weeks)10. 
The hazard rate is negative duration dependent after reaching its maximum value of about 0.5 at 
12-20 weeks. A falling hazard rate over time is usually found in empirical duration studies for the 
10
 This fall of the appiication intensity also shows up when allowance is made for a structural 
change of parameters after six periods. 
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Netherlands (see for an overview, Gorter et al., 1993a). The matching probability of the "average" 
application is between 20-30% during the first six months, but becomes much lower in the last 
period. The estimate of the conditional matching probability is much higher than the values found 
in studies of Lindeboom et al., 1993 (about 8%) and Gorter et al., 1993a (4-6%). In the latter study, 
the conditional matching probability could be interpreted as the conditional job offer probabiiity 
due to the assumption that people know the wage rate associated with a vacancy before they 
apply and that they will only apply if the wage rate is higher than the reservation wage. It should 
also be emphasized that both studies obtained their results on the basis of people who were not 
working and actively seeking for a job, while the present study concentrates on registered 
unemployed people, who are eligible to unemployment benefits. 
Next, we show the effect of "Counselling and Monitoring" on the hazard rate, the application 
intensity and the matching probability for an average unemployed individual who had a previous 
permanent job (83 % of the sample) in Figure 2,3 and 4, respectively. The effect of CM is 
estimated separateiy for those who had a permanent job and those who had not. This is done 
because those who worked temporarily could only join the programma if they reported to be 
willing to search for permanent jobs. Clearly, this might bias the overall estimate of CM on the 
hazard. 
Figure 2 Hazard rate for unemployed people. who had a previous permanent job 
0.5 
0.45 
0.4 
0.35 
ïï 0.2 
O 
§ 0.15 
N < X 
0. 1 
0.05 
0 
4 S 12 "IB 2D 24 28 32 
DURATION IN WEEKS 
D CM Si PERMANENT A NOT CM & PERMANENT 
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Figure 3 Application intensity for unemployed people. who had a previous permanent job 
DURATION IN WEEKS 
CM S. PERMANENT X NOT OM & PERMANENT 
Figure 4 Matchina probabilitv for unemployed people. who had a previous permanent job 
0 . 3 / ^ \ 
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From Figure 2,3 and 4, we observe that CM has a positive effect on the hazard rate (although not 
significant, see Table 2) as a result of a higher appiication intensity11, while the matching 
probability becomes even slightly lower. Hence, the conclusion can be drawn that CM unemployed 
people reduces the duration to find a job because "guided" people apply more than "non-guided" 
people, while keeping about the same "success" probability. 
For people who were previously employed via a temporary employment agency, we find that 
CM increases duration due to a substantially reduced matching probability, indicating that either 
the job seeker or the employer has become more selective. At first sight, the impact of CM seems 
contraproductive, but we should take into account that this group aims to switch to permanent 
work which can be regarded as favourable from a long-term perspective. 
Analogous to the effect of CM, we are able to demonstrate the impact of other exogenous 
variables on the hazard rate, the appiication intensity and the matching probability. in Figure 5,6 
and 7, we present the effect of different levels of education (primary, extended vocational, and 
academie). 
Figure 5 Hazard rate for unemployed people with different levels of education 
0.5 
D PRIMARY 
DURATION IN WEEKS 
+ EXTENDED VOC. O ACADEMIC 
11
 It is noteworthy that we find a significant positive effect of CM on the appiication intensity 
if we do not differentiate between subgroups (estimated parameter: 0.20, Standard error: 0.05), 
while the overall fit of the model is unaffected. 
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Figure 6 Application intensitv for unemployed people with different levels of education 
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Figure 7 Matchina probability for unemploved people with different levels of education 
DURATION IN WEEKS 
+ EXTENDED VOC. ACADEMIC 
17 
We conclude that people with an extended vocational education have a high job finding rate, 
mainly due to a high matching probability (which is rising from 25% to 35% per application during 
the first 20 weeks). It is also shown that people with a primary education have a much lower job 
finding rate than people with a extended vocational level due to both a lower application rate and 
lower matching probability. Our last remark concerns the outcome for academies who have the 
lowest job finding rate despite their many attempts to obtain a job (the application rate is about 
twice as high compared with the "primary" level) because they face an extremely low matching 
probability (which is less than 15% per application) 
To conclude this section, we want to examine whether the estimation results of the reduced-
form models for the duration and the application intensity are not biased by the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity. For this purpose, the models are re-estimated with a two-points 
heterogeneity component (vvv2) included in the constant term of the hazard (or application) rate. 
In case of the duration model, the marginal density function of duration becomes as follows 
f{t) =p.f(f |e1)+(1-p).f(f | f l2), 
ej(f|Z,X(f),CM,/c.1) = 
8 V 1 ' ' 
exp(Z /a2+X(f) /<T2^M./32+£D i(r).[T2 j+ö2 .fc i_1]+Vj) . for I " 1 - 2 
i = 1 
with p reparameterised as 
= exp(6) (18) 
l+exp(e) 
Next, the parameters of the duration model (a2.B2,72i>&2'a2'E'vi'v2) a r e e s t i m a t e c l by maximum 
likelihood. For the application model, a similar approach is foliowed. For both models, the added 
heterogeneity components (v^Vg) converge to the same value, while the probability parameter e 
becomes zero (so that p=1 /2). The parameters of CM and other variables remained approximately 
the same as in Table 2. Apparently, the statistical variation of the hazard (and also application) rate 
over time was already captured by the time-varying dummy variables and search variables. Hence, 
we conclude that neglected heterogeneity does not influence the outcomes of the reduced-form 
models. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
in this paper, we examined the effect of "Counselling and Monitoring" the unemployed on their job 
finding rate, application intensity and the matching probability by using a semi-structural duration 
model in which the probability to find a job is equal to the product of the application intensity and 
the "success" probability of an application. 
The empirical model is derived from a theoretical search model with variable search (i.e., 
application) intensity. Estimation results are obtained by using data, gathered by the Joint 
Administration Office in order to evaluate the "Counselling and Monitoring" programme, on the 
duration to find a job and the number of applications made. 
The empirical results show that "Counselling and Monitoring" the unemployed reduces the 
duration to find a job because "guided" people apply more than "non-guided" people, while 
keeping about the same matching (or "success") probability. However, the estimated effects of CM 
are not statistically significant (at 10%) so that we can not rely too much on our results to 
formulate policy recommendations. Nevertheless, the results may be interpreted as favourable 
because CM increases the hazard rate of leaving unemployment for people who had a previous 
permanent job with approximately 11%. 
We also observe that the "job search assistance" programma CM is not capable to increase 
the matching probability of the unemployed. More favourable effects on the success probability 
of an application, which is probably mainly determined by the employer's acceptance behaviour, 
might be obtained by using other programmes such as (re)-schooling and job training. 
Moreover, the estimation results of our model are used to get more insight into the 
determinants of the application intensity of unemployed job seekers. The empirical results of the 
application model appear to be understandable in the context of our theoretical job search model. 
For example, it is f ound that younger persons with a higher educational level apply more f requently 
than oider people with a lower educational level, which would - according to our underlying model 
- stem from their higher expected revenues or lower expected costs of applying. 
Finally, we consider the approach foliowed in this paper to be promising because ft reveals 
both the determinants of search (application) intensity of unemployed job seekers and the 
"success" probability of such activities. 
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